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Abstract 
 
This paper critically reconsiders debates about the business case for workplace diversity as 
exemplified in LGBT activism. These debates have long suggested that there is an 
oppositional distinction between justifying diversity on self-interested business grounds, and 
justifying it the grounds of ethics, equality and social justice. This has led to an impasse 
between ethically driven diversity theory and activism, and the dominant business case 
approach commonly deferred to in managerial practice. As a way of mediating this impasse 
the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how ‘ethical praxis’ can be deployed both 
despite and because of non-ethically motivated approaches to ethics in business. Drawing on 
Judith Butler and Emmanuel Levinas’ considerations of the relationship between ethics and 
the practice of justice, it is argued that critiques of the business case for diversity rely on a 
pure ethics that does not adequately recognize its connection to lived politics. Conversely, 
support for the business case evinces a politics that has failed to remember its origin in ethics. 
The paper positions ethical praxis as a political intervention undertaken in the name of ethics 
and uses this to suggest that the business case, despite its ethical poverty, holds potential to 
create real opportunities for justice in organizations.  
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Introduction 
 
Justice and social equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people has 
become an issue of major contestation on the global political agenda. This is a battle where 
homosexuality is still a crime in many countries, where LGBT people face discrimination, 
harassment and violence in society, where family law applies unequally to people in non-
heterosexual relationships, and where same-sex marriage is aggressively opposed by many 
factions of society. Nowhere has this battle been played out more strongly than in the 
workplace (Humphrey, 1999; Raeburn, 2004; Colgan and Rumens, 2014). In this arena 
LGBT people continue to experience discrimination, abuse and stigmatization (Ng, 
Schweitzer and Lyones, 2012) despite activism seeking to address these issues having been in 
place since the 1970s. While part of a broader movement for LGBT equality, activism in the 
workplace has its own unique characteristics. Chief amongst these if that in order to garner 
organizational support, those promoting workplace equality have long been pressured to 
“balance their activist agendas with the need to contribute to the organization” by helping 
“create competitive advantage or improve organizational effectiveness” (Githens and Aragon, 
2009: 124). 
 
The situation today is that “the proactive take-up of organizational equality and diversity 
activities [has been] driven by business case and bottom line arguments” (Özbilgin and Tatli, 
2011: 1235). Although the business case for diversity has been advocated in management 
practice, it has come under severe criticism, especially on moral grounds. Indeed, critically 
questioning the value of ‘business case’ arguments is an established part of diversity studies 
(Zanoni et al, 2010). The resulting situation is that “tension between an approach based on 
utilitarian arguments (the business case) and an approach based on social justice and human 
rights forms a crucial point of debate in the diversity and equality field” (Tomlinson and 
Schwabenand, 2010: 102). This tension arises because support for the business case relies on 
the presumption that “being morally good is materially good for business” (Michalos, 2013: 
599), while critics see it as being ‘fatally flawed’ because it rests on a set of motives that are 
not ethically driven (Cragg, 2002). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to critically reconsider debates about the business case for 
diversity, with specific reference to LGBT activism. While some argue that “radical practice 
of diversity necessarily involves rejection of the business case” (Tomlinson and 
Schwabenand, 2010: 116) the paper will explore how what will be called ‘ethical praxis’ can 
effectively operate within and against such business logic.  Critiques of business case 
approaches rely on a consideration of the meaning of ethics as it resides in the motives of 
organizations. While this is an important consideration it fails to account for how the business 
case logic can actually be used for purposes that are different from, and possibly in 
contradiction with, those motives. This calls for a way of theorizing diversity politics that, 
instead of standing on the moral high ground, adds to its ethical position a concern with the 
practicalities and possibilities of praxis. Such praxis emerges from considering how theory, in 
this case ethical theory, might inform “methods of acting in, engaging with, and addressing 
concrete ethics issues” (Nielsen, 1993: 131). To be clear this paper seeks to document, 
explore and to some extent theorize this praxis but, emphatically, not to have invented it.  The 
hope is to contribute to a research agenda that will highlight how diversity activists already 
have and can pursue workplace justice in organizations where business based justifications 
for organizational changes of any kind are demanded. With such an agenda it is justice that is 
the unfaltering goal, yet it is a manipulation and exploitation of the business case logic that 
can be part of the political means. 
 
In exploring the idea of an ethical praxis for diversity, the paper begins by reviewing and 
problematizing the distinction between business case and social justice justifications as they 
have become dominant in discussions workplace diversity, including specially LGBT 
diversity. This distinction holds that while business approaches see diversity as just another a 
means for securing commercial self-interest, social justice approaches claim a genuine ethical 
interest beyond business justification. Second, the paper explores the specifics of LGBT 
diversity in terms of heteronormativity (Warner, 1993) and cisnormativity (Spencer and 
Capuzza, 2016) such that the identification of LGBT people as a belonging to a singular 
category is based on them being ‘other’ to the assumed norms of cisgendered heterosexuality. 
This is explained through Judith Butler’s (2003, 2004, 2005, 2015) reading of the ethical 
theory of Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1974, 1985, 2003) as it relates to the politics of 
de/humanization. Third, Levinas’ conception of justice is explored as a means to argue that 
the ethics of diversity must be matched with a politics if it is to be effective. Through this, 
ethical praxis is identified as a means through which diversity activism can be theorized and 
has been practiced as an ethically informed yet pragmatic politics. Fourth, the issue of the 
business case for workplace diversity is reconsidered in relation to this ethical praxis so as to 
interrogate and elaborate the ethical possibilities that the business case logic inadvertently 
gives rise to. The paper concludes by outlining how ethical praxis is a way that both uses and 
resists instrumental approaches to diversity so as to break impasse between the business case 
and the social justice case.  
 
The Business Case for LGBT Diversity 
 
For contemporary corporations workforce diversity has become a major managerial and 
commercial concern (Herring and Henderson, 2014) heralded by a shift over the past 20 years 
from a focus on equality and equal opportunity to diversity management (Kirton and Greene, 
2009). Central to debates on diversity has been a consideration of the motives behind why 
organizations have and should seek to adopt it. The debates have revolved almost exclusively 
around the distinction between the business case and the social justice case for diversity 
(Bleijenbergh, Peters and Poutsma, 2010) with the legal case sometimes added as a 
motivation but usually only when discussing public sector organizations (Colgan et al, 2009; 
Healy et al, 2011). Although activism for workplace diversity originated from social concerns 
about discrimination and injustice towards women and racial minorities, in its adoption in 
business it has taken a much more economic and commercially driven direction (Tomlinson 
and Schwabenland, 2010). What is referred to as the ‘business case approach’ is the dominant 
justification for diversity. It claims that a diverse workforce, at both firm and labour market 
levels, has direct business benefits. Hence it is for the purpose of commercial self-interest that 
forms of discrimination that impede diversity should be removed (Konrad, 2003).  
 
The present situation, as initiated in the 1990s, is that “practices and discourses of diversity 
management have been increasingly justified by reference to business case arguments, 
leaving the impression that social justice concerns are less relevant” (Tatli et al, 2015: 1233). 
This has resulted from “a shift where market discourses of the business case replaced moral 
discourses of justice and tolerance” (Kamp and Hagedorn-Rasmussen, 2004: 532). One effect 
of this has been the depoliticization of equality and the usurpation of justice based activism 
with business based pragmatism (Kirton and Greene, 2009). As with practices of gender and 
racial diversity that preceded it, LGBT diversity has also been enrolled in this logic. The 
justification is that organizations with “high sexual orientation diversity [and] with a strong 
proactive diversity strategy” will outperform their peers (Cunningham, 2011b: 458). This 
view is also shared by managers who state that in relation to LGBT employees “corporate 
business objectives [are] the major drivers shaping diversity policy and practice” (Colgan, 
2011: 731).  
 
Benefits from diversity, it has been argued, come in the form of: cost savings through lower 
turnover, reduced absenteeism, fewer discrimination lawsuits, improved quality of staff, 
improved understanding of diverse consumers, and increased creativity (Robinson and 
Dechant, 1997). With specific reference to LGBT diversity, positive business outcomes also 
include opening up markets within LGBT communities, driving organizational culture 
change by including diverse perspectives, and appearing ‘family friendly’ by supporting 
same-sex parent families (Foldy and Creed, 1999). It is also suggested that promoting LGBT 
diversity results in reduced workplace conflict and improved job satisfaction (Sawyer et al, 
2015). An organizational culture dominated by heterosexism is argued to prevent many 
lesbian, gay and bisexual workers from being ‘out’ in the workplace as well as heightening 
levels of discrimination; both of which can be result in role conflict, turnover and poor job 
satisfaction (King and Cortina, 2010). It has further been surmised that “sexual orientation 
diversity is positively associated with the presence of a creative work environment, and that 
this relationship is strengthened when there is a strong commitment to diversity within the 
organization.” (Cunningham, 2011a: 1042-1043). When, in 2003, the UK outlawed 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the justification for the passing of those laws 
included business case arguments (Colgan et al 2009). 
 
The enthusiasm for promoting LGBT diversity to achieve commercial goals has endured 
significant critique (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000; Heres and Benschop, 2010). This critique rests 
on the distinction between the business case approach and one that is committed primarily to 
addressing issues of “social justice, lack of representation, and discrimination within society 
and organizations” (Ahonen et al, 2014: 263). Here, social justice is seen as an ethically 
justified end in its own right, irrespective of commercial imperatives or effects. By 
implication the logic and discourse of business serve to sully the more idealistic notions of 
ethics, fairness and justice. Even in practice it has been argued that it is not business led 
initiatives that lead to improved levels of equality for LGBT employees. Instead, “impetus for 
sexual orientation equality work in many organisations has been the activism of LGBT 
people and their allies” and “based on social group membership, a social justice case and the 
need for collectivised action” (Colgan and McKearney, 2012: 360 and 372).  
 
It has been postulated that “the most notorious aspect of the diversity approach is that it seeks 
to bring about change within organisations on the basis of the ‘pull’ of business benefits” 
(Braithwaite, 2010: 147). This notoriety arises from an ethical critique of commercial self-
interest. The logic is that if diversity is adopted for business reasons, then its motives are 
selfish rather than arising from ethical demands for equality and justice. With business case 
diversity, social justice is argued to be sidelined because “the business case perspectives on 
diversity management often treats workforce diversity as a strategic asset based on an 
implicit assumption that achieving equality and social justice are not the legitimate ‘business’ 
of organizations” (Tatli et al, 2015: 1246). Moreover, the implication is that if diversity and 
anti-discrimination programs do not result in commercial advantages, then they are best 
abandoned in favour of whatever other initiatives will (Knights and Omanović, 2016). The 
danger of the business case approach is thus identified as leading to “regressive equality 
outcomes if differences are deemed relevant only when they are compatible with bottom line 
demands” (Özbilgin and Tatli, 2011: 1231).  
 
The dominance of the business case argument is said to have led to a patchy and uneven 
application of diversity practices in organizations. This is especially so for LGBT diversity, 
as LGBT issues are still regarded by many as either a ‘sensitive’ or ‘taboo’ area (Colgan et al, 
2009). While diversity management as a general organizational practice is well established, it 
remains the case that LGBT diversity is not acted upon and that research (Yang and Konrad, 
2010) and organizational programs have “a predominant focus on differences emanating from 
people’s ethnicity/race, sex and age” (Heres and Benschop, 2010: 441). If there is a business 
case for diversity, it seems that it applies unequally to those categorized as LGBT as 
compared to women and racial minorities. This difference is also noted within the generalized 
category of LGBT. The joining together of diverse sexualities and bodies identified under this 
rubric, while possible a valuable as a political alliance, obfuscates the different types and 
levels of discrimination that different people face. This has meant, for example, that while 
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals might more easily assimilate into the business case logic, 
transgender people are largely ignored by diversity management (Ozturk and Tatli, 2015) 
while at the same time being chronically subjected to aggression, hostility, animosity and 
discrimination in the workplace (Sangganjanavanicha and Cavazos, 2010) . Even the justice 
of the business case is not meted out equally.  
 
LGBT ‘Identity’, Ethics, Hetero- and Cisnormativity  
 
LGBT diversity differs from other forms (especially gender diversity) in that its object is not 
a group identified in terms of a singular shared identity or set of identity characteristics, nor 
are LGBT people a “unified social group” (Colgan, 2016). For example, on their own terms 
there is little intrinsically in common between a transgender sex worker, a gay stock broker, 
and a non-binary teenager working at McDonald’s after school. Even though the workplace 
challenges faced by people of different sexual orientations and identities are quite different 
from each other (Shore et al 2009; Chung 2003) each can be classified as being the subject of 
LGBT diversity. What gives people categorized as LGBT commonality resides less in a 
shared identity and more in a shared alterity; in what they are not. To be LGBT means to not 
to conform to the ideals valorized in heteronormative and cisnormative culture as they relate 
to sexuality and gender. With heteronormativity (Warner, 1993) the reference is to  “the 
institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality 
seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also privileged” (Warner and 
Berlant, 1998: 548). Heteronormativity operates at a moral level so as to define 
heterosexuality as being part of a culture bestowed with “rightness and normalcy” (p. 554). It 
is a regulatory practice embedded in law, social institutions and everyday practices 
(Chambers and Carver, 2008), and, traditionally, in the workplace. Heteronormativity 
establishes heterosexuality’s political power (Chambers, 2007) through inclusion and 
exclusion. Cisnormativity also relates to dominant heteroseuxuality, but specifically reflects a 
cultural norm that assumes that “gender remains stable and also supports a gender binary, 
assuming there are exactly two genders, and that every person is either/or” (Spencer and 
Capuzza, 2016: 13).  As with heteronormtivity, what is in place with cisnormativity is the 
powerful categorization of people in opposition to an assumed norm, and the discrimination 
that is enacted through that power (Bendl and Hoffman, 2015).  As such, the category of 
LGBT, rather than having an internally consistent structure of common characteristics, 
identities, desires or practices, is defined as the agglomeration of various possibilities around 
gender, sex and desire that do not conform with hetero- and cisnormativity (Bendl, 
Fleischmann, and Walenta, 2008). In this sense hetero- and cis- normativity produces its 
LGBT other, at least on a categorical level. The social justice case for LGBT diversity thus 
rests on an ethically motivated resistance to these normativities in the workplaces (Rumens 
and Tyler, 2015; Bendl and Hoffman, 2015).  
 
Hetero- and cisnormative exclusion and LGBT workplace activism as it relates to ethics and 
politics can be fruitfully understood through Judith Butler’s more recent work (see Rumens 
and Tyler, 2015), especially as it draws on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas1. As Butler 
(2004) explains, Levinas shows how ethics is not rooted in reflexive awareness or knowledge 
of either one’s self or of others, but rather in the self being disrupted by the other. Morality, 
then, “does not proceed from my autonomy or my reflexivity” (p. 130) instead it is that very 
sense of the self that is rendered precarious by a responsibility that comes from the other. For 
Levinas (1969) the very meaning of ethics resides in a primordial respect, care and reverence 
for the other person, where that person is regarded not as another of me, but as being unique 
and unassimilable into my own knowledge. Levinas offers an ethics of the other, in that 
rather than being based on self-love, self-comparison or self-interest it finds its original locus 
                                                            
1 Butler’s engagement with Levinas in the 2000s is not primarily related to a consideration of gender or 
sexuality, but rather to issues of the meaning of morality (2005), global politics (2004) and political Zionism in 
particular (2013). Theoretically, however, the issues Butler draws out are relevant to politics in its different 
manifestations, including, in this case LGBT politics.  
in concrete experience with the other person. This ethics is thus opposed to egotism, greed 
and hubris. For Levinas the ethical expression of being human rests on an “exception to 
selfishness, infantile narcissism, and egocentricity” (Marcus, 2015: 13) such that “the other 
concerns me despite myself” (Levinas, 2003: 57). This focus on alterity is clearly salient to 
workplace diversity in that “diversity in Levinasian terms inevitably involves the ethical 
acknowledgement of the Other’s otherness” (Muhr, 2008: 186); the very acknowledgement 
precluded organizationally by hetero- and cisnormativity. For Butler, this engagement with 
alterity is political in that “power circumscribes the kinds of ethical encounters that take place 
– how existing normative frames operate to regulate and determine who counts (and who 
doesn’t count)” (Lloyd, 2008: 103). This power operates through a self whose being “is 
dependent, not just on the existence of the other in its singularity (as Levinas would have it), 
but also on the social dimension of normativity that governs the scene of recognition” 
(Butler, 2005: 23). Hetero- and cisnormativity are such dimensions. 
 
At stake are two distinct modes of alterity. The first, aligned with hetero- and cisnormativity, 
is where the LGBT other is cast as abnormal, marginalized and subject to discrimination. The 
second is where the other is regarded as unique, irreplaceable and deserving of respect and 
devotion (Rhodes and Westwood, 2016). Butler’s (2004) reading of Levinas alerts us to it is 
how this latter meaning is centrally related to a politics of de/humanization. If the other’s 
difference from what is taken as the norm is used as the basis for discrimination in the 
context of oppressive social values, then that other is effaced and dehumanized. Conversely, 
if the other is approached in terms of their infinite uniqueness, and responded to with genuine 
care and respect, then alterity is a prompt to humanization and, in Levinas’ term, ethics. The 
specific character of LGBT as a category conceived through alterity thus renders an ethics of 
LGBT diversity conceivable in relation to Butler’s account of humanization. Discrimination 
against a person not conforming to hetero- or cisnormativity is a force that would rob them of 
any right to be treated as an ethical other. If, following Levinas, we are awakened to ethics by 
difference, awakened by the other, then the normalizing discourse Butler refers to serves to 
categorize certain people as not deserving of such ethical attention. Butler gives the example 
of how the “queer lives that vanished on September 11 are not publicly welcomed into the idea of 
national identity currently being built in the obituary pages”such that “humanization takes 
place differently through variable norms of recognition” (Butler, 2003: 23 and 30). 
 
For Levinas ethics is “the calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the 
other” (1969: 43). By spontaneity Levinas refers to one’s sense of completeness as an 
individual who uses freedom to pursue one’s own self-centred goals. Spontaneity is a “joyous 
possession of the world” (1969: 76) for oneself and one’s own gratification. Ethics, in this 
arrangement, is that which questions one’s own freedom and demands that engagement with 
the world for one’s own ends is always open to question by the other person. With 
spontaneity the other is just a part of the world that is at my disposal. Spontaneity is hence a 
sense of “autonomy to the point of internalizing or comprehending exteriority, placing the 
other in a closed context of meaning” (Nelson et al 2005: 121). Ethics, in contrast, is a 
thorough questioning of the primacy of the ego in the name of the other; it interrupts the very 
formation of self and its interests. Levinas’ ethics evinces a ‘humanism of the other’ (2003); 
one not emanating from the self and its righteousness, but originating in the other person and 
one’s ethical obligation to that other. This is an other that appears as a ‘face’ (rather than as a 
category such as LGBT): a unique and incomparable other who reminds us that we are not 
alone in our self-absorption, and that we are indebted to the other for our very existence.  
 
Butler and Levinas’ account of ethics, as canvassed so far, serves us well in explaining the 
ethical critique of the business case for LGBT diversity. This is so in that the business case is 
castigated in terms of its primary drive for organizational self-interest. The actions arising 
from self-justified organizational rationality are of course not identical to Levinas’ account of 
spontaneity. The two do, however, resonate in how corporate action on diversity can be 
understood as a variation of a “solitary freedom that does not put itself into question” (1969: 
304) but rather maintains the solidity and primacy of its hetero- and cisnormative self-interest 
as can be accomplished through its categorization of otherness. Following Butler, it is this 
categorization that produces a discourse of social norms that creates and perpetuates 
discrimination. Notably, the corporation is clearly not a person who is acting in the world. 
Actions are taken in its name by people whose own sense of who they are is wrapped up in an 
identification with the hetero- and cisnormative character of the corporate person that is 
notionally able to pursue what are construed as its own interests. It is on the basis of this 
corollary that the business case for LGBT diversity can be described as an affront to a ‘moral 
imperative’ rested on the illusion that “there is a continuous match between business needs 
and the rights and needs of disadvantaged groups” (Jonsen et al, 2013: 276). Conversely the 
argument for the social justice case would claim that ethics would drive business to question 
its own spontaneously accepted idea of its self and its hetero- and cisnormative legacy so as 
to be interrupted by its responsibility for LGBT others; to yield to its responsibility for the 
sake of ethics itself by bringing its own hetero- and cisnormative identity into question.  
 
Justice, Politics and Praxis After Spontaneity and Ethics 
 
While the discussion so far goes some way in understanding the impetus behind a moral 
critique of the business case approach, care needs to be taken not to stop here. While Levinas 
distinguishes between ethics and spontaneity, this serves to understand the very ethics of 
ethics itself, rather than to proclaim it as a normative or evaluative practice. The purpose in 
doing so “does not consist in constructing ethics […but only to…] find its meaning” 
(Levinas, 1985: 90). Levinas’ ethics, taken alone, does not set out any specific or prescriptive 
ethics; it explores the more fundamental sense of the ethical that would lie beneath any such 
system. Because of this, while Levinas’ ethics might be drawn on to inform an understanding 
of the ethics of LGBT diversity, it is not adequate to inform its practice. That is to say it is not 
a praxis because it does not lend itself alone to political action and its justification. Levinas 
offers an ethics described in what can appear as idealistic terms, elaborating how ethics is 
revealed in the face of the other such that we are awakened from selfish slumber and come to 
realised our ethical subservience to that other. Levinas even goes so far as to state that the 
ethical subject is a hostage to the other, persecuted by the other, and always willing to 
sacrifice itself for the other (Levinas, 1998). Acknowledging  this, the practical implications 
of Levinas’ ethics emerge through the consideration of the passage from the meaning of 
ethics, to the practicalities of politics (Butler, 2014) and justice in the social world (Critchley, 
1992). This Levinasian ‘ethico-politics’ (Fagan, 2013) provides us with a counterpoint to the 
spontaneity of the business case and the ethics of the social justice case noted above. This is 
so, because ethical praxis exceeds the simple demands of ‘good conscience’ and comes to 
embody “the exigency to rebel against injustice committed against the other” (Tahmasebi-
Birgani, 2014: 12). Aligned with Butler’s position, there is a continuity between ethics and 
politics, such that “political struggles against the norm are a way of securing the possibility of 
ethical relations” (Lloyd, 2007:155) 
  
For Levinas, justice is called forth in response to the practical problems of enacting the 
excessive demands of ethics. Indeed, if a notion of ethics based on the sanctity of and 
responsibility towards the other person is accepted, what happens when one is called to 
responsibility for more than one person? This is what Levinas calls the entry of the ‘third 
party’ who divides one’s ethical attention between multiple others. It is in this sense that 
while justice can be regarded as the impossible but necessary task of distributing one’s care, 
duty and resources between people, each of whom is unique and incomparable as well as 
deserving (Levinas, 1974). In posing the question ‘how is it there is justice?’, Levinas (1985) 
responds:  
 
It is the fact of the multiplicity of men [sic] and the presence of someone else next to 
the Other, which condition the laws and establish justice. If I am alone with the Other, 
I owe him everything; but there is someone else. Do I know what my neighbor is in 
relation to someone else? Do I know if someone else has an understanding with him 
or his victim? Who is my neighbor? It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to 
judge, in comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal relation I establish with the 
Other, I must also establish with other men; it is thus a necessity to moderate this 
privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice. Justice, exercised through 
institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial 
interpersonal relation. (pp. 89-90) 
 
Justice is about how ethics manifests in the social and institutionalized world of inter-
personal relations. Moreover, as Butler (2014) explains, with justice we enter the realm of the 
political; a realm that inevitably involves a “deformation of the ethical” while at the same 
time being unrefusable if ethics is to bear on social practice (p. 55). While it is an ethical 
desire for and service to the other that inaugurates the need for justice, justice demands rules 
and rationality so as to decide and justify how things might be divided between all of the 
others. It also requires political intervention that will counter injustice as it arises, using the 
practical means that are at one’s disposal. Resting on either moral self-conviction or 
subsumption to one other is not enough if justice is the goal. In relation to organizations, what 
emerges is that the task of justice concerns the very nature of the exercise of, and resistance 
to, organizational power if that power is to be exercised in a manner that places ethics prior to 
it (Byers and Rhodes, 2007). Justice is the imperfect social implication of ethics. 
 
With this idea of justice ethics (manifested for our purposes here in the social justice case for 
LGBT diversity) becomes yoked to politics in that while “ethics is fundamental” it is also the 
case that this means that “politics and political justice are necessary” (Morgan, 2011: 109). 
The question for LGBT diversity is not just about whether or not it is righteous in its 
demands for ethical recognition, but also about what political actions can be taken so as to 
respond positively to that demand. The necessity of politics is such that ethics, if it is to be 
meaningful in communal life, must yield to political action that seeks justice. Ethics and 
politics are connected in an inseparable praxis (Fagan, 2013) whereby “politics intervenes to 
put a stop to interpersonal and intra-group violence” (Bergo, 1999: 253). Striving for equality 
in the workplace is an example of such a political intervention in response to the spontaneity 
enacted in the name of organizational self-interest. It is here that business and justice cases 
for diversity interact rather than being conceived as separated by the ideational chasm 
between spontaneity and ethics. If political action is to be taken in organizations then the 
business case, as the dominant mode of the cultural logic of business, is an unavoidable part 
of that reality. This does not mean subsuming the demand for justice to business logic, but 
rather acknowledging that a politics that seeks justice cannot ignore it or wish it away with 
high minded thoughts of ethics and responsibility.  
 
For Levinas and for Butler, the political pursuit of justice is necessitated by ethics, but is 
always ethically compromised. The purity of ethics, realised in the selfless devotion and 
responsibility to the one other, must always be divided and diluted in the face of the demands 
of all of the other others. Politics in this sense is an ethical praxis that, while never forgetting 
its origin in ethics, must engage in the practical realities of life in order for justice to be 
pursued. The question for LGBT diversity based on a demand for justice, is not one that can 
reside on the righteous moral ground that distances itself from business and its cases in order 
to maintain the moralism of its own position. The business case for LGBT diversity is of 
course an example of politics playing out in organizations; one that exemplifies calls for 
justice and equality have been reformulated within an overriding business logic. It is a 
politics that has lost sight of the demand for justice that inaugurated it; reduced it to yet 
another vehicle for self-interested, myopic and autistic spontaneity. In responding to this, an 
ethical praxis for diversity does not dismiss the business case tout court from a moral high 
ground, but works both with and against it, using its logic for purposes of its own ethically 
inspired project. If anything the presence of the business case is a fissure in the long standing 
wall of hetero- and cisnormative discrimination. This does not mean disciplining oneself to 
the logic of business; it is about using the resources at hand to act out a politics whose 
justification is to resist and oppose those who “ignore the responsibility for the other” 
(Simmons, 1999: 98). That is, to oppose those organizations that ignore their responsibility to 
the LGBT other that they themselves have cast in their hetero- and cisnormative shadow. 
Might then the existence of the business case offer an opportunity rather than a threat to the 
possibilities for LGBT social justice? Might it not be something to be deployed politically for 
the sake of justice, rather than merely being castigated as justice’s unrighteous other? Might 
it not be something that can be politically employed for purposes beyond its own self-
justification? Can a politics of diversity that uses and engages with the business case still 
retain the principle that justice and politics must never forget their origin in ethics? 
 
Praxis, Ethics and Politics 
 
The distinction between the business and social justice cases for diversity has already been 
brought into question in diversity research where it is argued that a reconciliation can be 
found through organizational initiatives that “effectively combine performance with an 
affirmation of the value of the diverse other” (Gotsis and Kortzi, 2013: 948; Dijk et al, 2012; 
Maxwell, 2004; Swan and Fox, 2010).  This would be so when managers “support 
implementation of diversity management by both business-case arguments and by social-
justice arguments” (Bleijenbergh et al, 2010) so as to “to obtain both equality and business 
success” (Kamp and Hagedorn-Rasmussen, 2004: 522). The results is a “dual agenda, meant 
to simultaneously foster the attainment of both the organization’s strategic goals and social 
justice by advancing the individual development and inclusion of all members of the 
organization” (Heres and Benschop, 2010). How balanced this agenda can be has, however, 
been brought into critical question.  An affirmative answer as to whether organizations “will, 
or can, take the leap of faith necessary to give sufficient space to justice reasons for valuing 
diversity” has been judged as unlikely given “the extent that workplaces are constructed 
around the achievement of business or organizational goals” (Barnes and Ashtiany, 
2003:293). In practice it is clear that organizations adopt LGBTI-friendly policies for a 
variety of reasons that are not ethical in orientation.  These include conforming to socially 
constructed standards within the human resource management profession, compliance with 
anti-discrimination laws, and competing with business rivals who have implemented such 
policies (Newbury, Gardber, Hudson and Pfeffer, 2015).  
 
Following the discussion of ethics and politics that has been evinced here, even if the 
hopefulness of the dual agenda approach was possible it is still ethically inadequate. Seeking 
to reconcile corporate self-interest with the pursuit the ethical demands of the other puts 
ethics and self-interest on equal grounds. Following Levinas, however, justice must always 
be preceded by and subordinated to the ethics of the other. The other is the only ethical 
authority. What has been called here ethical praxis differs from the dual agenda approach in 
that rather than seeking reconciliation with commercial interests, for justice to be meaningful 
on its the terms of its own origin, those interests must always be subordinated to ethical basis 
of that justice. This does not mean taking the high moral ground where business cases are to 
be wholly rejected (Tomlinson and Schwabenand, 2010) and social justice cases put on a 
pedestal of ethical idealism (Colgan and McKearney, 2012).  Indeed, narrowing down 
diversity “into the varieties of pure social activists versus co-opted management” is not 
necessarily helpful to the realities of political practice (Swan and Fox, 2010: 571). 
Accordingly, the ‘praxis’ in ethical praxis means that pursuing the ethics of LGBT equality 
involves engaging in a politics of change that uses the resources at hand to aid that pursuit. 
Moreover, while the rhetoric that creates the distinction between the business case and the 
social justice case fails to account for or acknowledge this politics, existing research into 
diversity practice both demonstrates and exemplifies how diversity activists are actually 
engaging in it. A central part of this politics involves exploring how the existence of the 
business case can be strategically used to pursue ethically informed justice, without 
succumbing its self-oriented logic. 
 
Established patterns of hetero- and cisnormative discrimination can clearly lead to LGBT 
people having less power, less access to resources, less influence over others, and less ability 
to advance to positions of power and prestige (Herek, 2007; Link and Phelen, 2001). Against 
this, diversity activism and management harbor the potential to create sites of resistance 
where “the ‘business case’ rhetoric of ‘workplace diversity’ can act like a Trojan horse: on 
the outside are the HRM [business case] arguments, on the inside is a passion for justice and, 
for the marginalized, a drive for empowerment” (Jones and Stablein, 2005:160). This 
involves not only LGBT employees and their allies joining to ‘rebel against injustice’ (see 
Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2014), but also recognizes that the business case provides a resource with 
which diversity can be sought through acts of resistance, rather than being simply dismissed 
on account of its manifest ethical poverty. It is the rhetoric of the business case that is a cleft 
through which action for the primary goal of social justice can be taken.  
 
It has been noted that the idea of ‘managing diversity’ focusses attention away from activism 
directed at equality for marginalised groups, and towards commercial and managerial 
agendas (Benschop, 2001). The danger is that diversity becomes a managerial tool rather than 
harbinger of social justice. Countering this, however, does not mean abstaining from 
understanding or exploiting business logic. This is practically accounted for in that  “while 
practitioners might use the business case model when appealing to senior managers, they also 
tend to define diversity with a social justice framework for themselves” (Ahmed, 2007: 241). 
While diversity management has been framed largely in relation to its business benefits, it is 
not a singular or homogenous discourse guided by just one motive. Despite the managerial 
centre of diversity management, there remains embedded in it the strong trace of social 
justice. This rings true even for those employed in organizations to promote diversity, in that 
while they “are supposed to be committed to the business case for diversity management that 
their organizations have employed […] they commonly have a wider personal vision of 
organizational change and development, including transforming inequalities, with an 
objective of social justice” (Tatli et al, 2015: 1247). It is this use of the business case for the 
primary purpose of redressing inequality that exemplifies ethical praxis. 
 
Accepting that the business case can be moblilized for the purpose of justice “leads to 
developing initiatives to counter inequality or discrimination while practising diversity 
management” (Kamp and Hagedorn-Rasmussen, 2004: 535) such that “playing the game is 
not simply a matter of deciding to be in or out, or choosing to sell out or keep pure” (Swan 
and Fox, 2010: 586). With ethical praxis business discourses related to diversity are used 
strategically (Tatli et al, 2015) and without fidelity to their own commercial logics. The 
question this infers is not so much about whether managerially oriented approaches to 
diversity are morally justifiable, but rather about whether they can be used to “assist in the 
realisation of greater workplace equality” (Barnes and Ashtiany, 2003: 275). This is a 
question of ethical praxis; a question of what can be done, given the situation one is in, to 
pursue justice in the name of ethics. A good example of this comes in the form of employer-
recognized LGBT employee groups established to “offer a space for social support and 
provide an organized platform from which employees can advocate for changes within their 
workplaces” (Githens and Aragon, 2009: 121). The significant expansion of such groups in 
recent years marks a particular and effective means through which justice has been pursued 
and achieved by and for LGBT employees. Such employee groups engage with organizations 
in terms of asserting how supporting their objectives is a means for the organizations 
themselves to better achieve their goals. Despite this, it has been noted that those involved 
continue to identify as activists and that they “often frame equity and fairness issues in 
business terms, though their primary motivations are usually much larger than the goal of 
increasing corporate profit or improving organizational effectiveness” (p. 127). Another 
example is the use of formal metrics, such as the Stonewall Equality Index, as a means 
through which organizations measure sexual diversity. While such metrics are positioned as a 
source of competitive advantage, it has been noted that their existence means that “engaging 
in a business case discourse occasions opportunities for LGBT organizations to connect with 
companies using a language they understand” (Rumens, 2014: 189).  
 
Ethical praxis might be considered as the domain of ‘tempered radicals’: those “individuals 
who identify with and are committed to their organizations, and are also committed to a 
cause, community, or ideology that is fundamentally different from, and possibly at odds with 
the dominant culture of their organization” (Meyerson and Scully, 1995: 585). With ethical 
praxis, however, the pursuit of justice is not so much located in an ambivalent identity. 
Instead the dominant ‘business case logic’ of organizations is used strategically and without 
subsumption to it– ethical praxis is only in-between justice and business to the extent that 
justice is on top as the superordinate priority.  Without this there is always the threat that 
what began as political activism for the rights of LGBT people and other classified as 
‘diverse’, that is rights that have been historically denied by work organizations, can become 
incorporated into a corporate ideology enamoured by manipulating diversity for its own ends 
(Ward, 2008). Diversity management and its business case are by now well institutionalized 
within management thinking and practice (Kirby and Harter, 2001; Edelman, Fuller and 
Mara-Drita, 2001). While this institutionalization is more prevalent for gender and racial 
diversity, its driving logic of the business case is dominant across the general practice of 
diversity management. It is by exploiting this logic for the case of justice in the workplace 
that ethical praxis is enacted in a way that is not stymied by idealistic demarcations between 
business and social justice arguments. The Trojan horse of the business case (Jones and 
Stablein, 2005) acts as a means through which justice can be achieved. Employing this might 
mean resigning one’s ethical idealism, but it is a pragmatic choice that involves privileging 
the benefits of real improvements in justice, equality and diversity over the high moral 
ground that would divorce diversity politics  and activism from an engagement with the 
internal dynamics of business.  
 
Conclusion 
 
LGBT, as a classification relevant to workplace diversity, is an acronym whose identity is 
formed in opposition to the hetero- and cisnormative cultures that have long infused 
organizations. Moreover, the workplace issues facing individuals who might variously be 
identified with, or identify as, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender are far from consistent in 
nature or intensity. The same is true for the actual and possible political responses to those 
issues. Despite these differences LGBT, and its various correlates, has emerged as a political 
category that is central to workplace equality and diversity. Within this politics it is 
demonstrably the case that the distinction between the business case and the social justice 
case have formed a central distinction in how the motives for the pursuit of LGBT diversity 
have been formulated, as is indeed the case with diversity more generally. What has been 
argued in this paper is that this division, when looked at from the perspective ethical praxis, is 
neither as stable nor as useful as it might at first seem. This instability has opened political 
possibilities in that, irrespective of its motives, the institutionalization of a business case logic 
for diversity in organizations has allowed people to actively respond to ethical demands for 
diversity. Such a response uses the rhetoric of the business case for purposes for which it was 
not designed; that is for ethically motivated purposes. What this heralds is a politically 
motivated ethical resistance (Pullen and Rhodes, 2014) that turns the language of business 
back on itself for the sake of non-business related motives. While this does not redeem the 
ethics of organizations at the level of managerial practice, it does show how ethical praxis can 
be put in play despite that practice while still having to operate within the powerful cultural 
context that such practice creates. 
 
While others have hoped for a ‘dual agenda’ where diversity can lead to both business and 
social justice outcomes, in practice there is a likelihood that such an agenda will also mean 
social justice being constantly subservient to profit (Jones and Stablein, 2005). Railing 
against this, the contribution offered in the paper has been to demonstrate how ethical praxis 
can be deployed both despite and because of non-ethically motivated approaches to diversity 
in business. It has been asserted that critiques of the business case for diversity rely on a pure 
ethics that does not recognize the complexity of its connection to politics. Concurrently it has 
been acknowledged that the support for the business case evinces a politics that has failed to 
remember its origin in ethics. Ethical praxis has been positioned as a way out of the stalemate 
of such positions. Already exemplified in the concrete interventions of activists, this praxis is 
deserving of attention too by researchers. Such inquiries would continue to investigate how 
the business case for diversity, albeit justified on the grounds of organizational self-interest, 
can and has also been used to create real possibilities for justice in organizations. This would 
also show how political resources are being employed to achieve real improvements in 
justice, all the time never forgetting their origin in ethics.  
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